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Abstract 
The “financial crisis” and its sequel, the current sovereign debt crisis, appear to be the 
latest permutations of an old conflict between capitalism and democracy that forcefully 
reasserted itself after the end of the postwar growth period. Today’s calamities were 
preceded by high inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s, rising public deficits in the 1980s, 
and growing private indebtedness in the 1990s and 2000s. In each case, governments 
were faced with popular demands for prosperity and security that were incompatible 
with market allocation.  Inflation, deficits and financial under-regulation should not be 
understood as results of faulty economic management but rather as temporary stop-
gaps to simultaneously satisfy democratic-political claims for social justice and eco-
nomic claims for profitability. As the site of distributional conflict moved with time 
from the labor market and industrial relations to the politics of public spending, then 
to the provision of credit to private households, and from there to international fiscal 
diplomacy, it became increasingly insulated against popular democratic pressures. At 
the same time, the political and economic risks associated with the contradictions of 
democratic capitalism have increased, with potentially disruptive consequences for the 
social integration of democratic polities as well as for the system integration of ad-
vanced market economies. 
Zusammenfassung
Die sogenannte Finanzkrise von 2008 und die anschließende Krise der Staatsfinanzen 
müssen als jüngste Manifestation eines alten Konflikts zwischen Kapitalismus und De-
mokratie gesehen werden, der mit dem Ende der Wachstumsperiode der Nachkriegszeit 
neu aufgelebt ist. Vorläufer der heutigen politisch-ökonomischen Verwerfungen waren 
die Inflation der späten 1960er und der 1970er Jahre, die steigenden Haushaltsdefizite 
der 1980er Jahre und die zunehmende Privatverschuldung seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre. In 
allen Fällen waren demokratische Regierungen mit Forderungen nach steigenden Ein-
kommen und sozialer Sicherheit konfrontiert, die mit einer Allokation von Ressourcen 
nach den Spielregeln freier Märkte unvereinbar waren. Inflation, Haushaltsdefizite und 
Unter-Regulierung der Finanzmärkte waren im Kern nicht Folgen fehlerhafter Wirt-
schaftspolitik, sondern dienten der zeitweiligen Zufriedenstellung demokratisch-poli-
tischer Forderungen nach sozialer Gerechtigkeit, die mit wirtschaftlichen Forderungen 
nach Profitabilität und Verteilung nach Maßgabe marginaler Produktivität unvereinbar 
waren. In dem Maße, wie die Auseinandersetzung sich vom Arbeitsmarkt und den Ar-
beitsbeziehungen auf die öffentliche Haushaltspolitik, anschließend auf die Politik der 
Regulierung des Finanzsektors und von da auf die internationale Geldpolitik verlagerte, 
wurde der demokratisch-kapitalistische Verteilungskonflikt zunehmend gegen demo-
kratischen Druck von unten isoliert. Gleichzeitig nahmen die den Widersprüchen des 
demokratischen Kapitalismus inhärenten Risiken zu, mit potenziell schwerwiegenden 
Folgen sowohl für die soziale Integration demokratischer Gesellschaften als auch die 
Systemintegration fortgeschrittener Marktwirtschaften.
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Max Weber Lecture at the European University Institute, Florence, April 20, 2011. I am grateful to 
Daniel Mertens for competent research assistance.
The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism  
and Its Contradictions
What can a social scientist contribute to our understanding of that world-shaking event, 
the collapse of the American financial system, that occurred in 2008 and has since 
turned into an economic and political crisis of global dimensions? Nobody expects a 
sociologist to offer practical advice on to how to repair the damage and prevent similar 
disasters in the future: what “stress tests” to apply to banks; what capital reserves to 
require them to hold; or whether to create and how to design a bailout mechanism 
for bankrupt states belonging to a currency union. In one sense, of course, this is un-
fortunate as there are obviously no consulting fees to collect here. On the other hand, 
however, regrettable as this may be, it may actually be an advantage as it makes it un-
necessary for sociologists or political scientists to believe, or pretend to believe, that in 
principle at least there does exist a fix for the problem and that one only needs to find it. 
Unlike the economic mainstream, sociology in particular, unless it has given in to fash-
ionable pressures to convert to a “rational choice” model of social order, or alternatively 
has failed to leave behind the Parsonian functionalism of the 1950s, is in no way com-
pelled to conceive of society as governed by a general tendency toward equilibrium, 
where crises and change are no more than temporary deviations from what is for most 
of the time the steady state of a normally well-integrated social system. Rather than 
having to construe our present affliction as a singular disturbance to a fundamental 
condition of stability, a sociological, i.e. not an efficiency-theoretical approach to politi-
cal economy can afford to try out a historical perspective relating today’s crisis to earlier, 
similar events, and explore the possibility of them being systematically related, both by 
historical sequence and by common causes. In fact this is what I will do in this lecture, 
in which I will suggest considering the Great Recession (Reinhart/Rogoff 2009) and the 
subsequent near-collapse of the modern tax state’s public finances as a manifestation of 
an underlying basic tension in the political-economic configuration of advanced capi-
talist societies, a tension that makes disequilibrium and instability the rule rather than 
the exception, and that has found expression in a historical succession of different but 
cognate disturbances of the socio-economic order.
More specifically, I will argue that the present crisis can be fully understood only when 
considered as one more stage in an ongoing, inherently conflictual evolution and trans-
formation of that very particular social formation that we call democratic capitalism. 
Democratic capitalism came to be more or less safely established only after the Second 
World War and only in the Western part of the world. There it functioned extraordinarily 
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well for the next two to three decades – so well in fact that this period, which was one 
of uninterrupted economic growth, still dominates our ideas and expectations of what 
modern capitalism (Shonfield 1965) is or should and could be. This is true in spite of 
the fact that looked at with hindsight and in the light of the turbulences that followed, 
the quarter century immediately after the war should without difficulty be recognizable 
as truly exceptional. Indeed I suggest that it is not the trente glorieuses (Judt 2005) but 
the series of crises that followed that is representative of the normal condition of demo-
cratic capitalism. That condition, I maintain, is ruled by an endemic and essentially 
irreconcilable conflict between capitalist markets and democratic politics that, having 
been temporarily suspended for the historically short period immediately following 
the war, forcefully reasserted itself when high economic growth came to an end in the 
1970s. I will now in general terms discuss the nature of that conflict before I turn to the 
sequence of political-economic disturbances produced by it that preceded as well as 
shaped the present global crisis.
I
Suspicions that capitalism and democracy may not easily go together are far from new. 
Beginning in the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, the bourgeoisie and 
the political Right were afraid that majority rule, being inevitably the rule of the poor 
over the rich, would ultimately do away with private property and free markets. The ris-
ing working class and the political Left, for their part, were fearful of capitalists allying 
themselves with the forces of reaction to abolish democracy, in a search for protection 
from being governed by a permanent majority dedicated to the redistribution of eco-
nomic advantage and social status. I will not discuss here the relative merits of the two 
positions, although I believe that, unfortunately, at least in the industrialized world, the 
Left had more reason to fear the Right overthrowing democracy in order to save capital-
ism, than the Right had to fear the Left abolishing capitalism for the sake of democracy. 
However that may be, in the years immediately after the Second World War it was a 
widely shared assumption that for capitalism to be compatible with democracy, it had 
to be subjected to extensive political control1 so as to protect democracy from having to 
be restrained in the name of free markets. While Keynes and, to an extent, Kalecki and 
Polanyi carried the day, Hayek had to withdraw into temporary exile.
This was not to remain so, however. Today’s political economy literature, to the extent 
that it comes out of mainstream economics, is obsessed with the figure of the oppor-
tunistic or myopic, in any event irresponsible, politician who caters to an economically 
uneducated electorate by fiddling with otherwise efficient markets and thereby prevent-
1 For example through nationalization of key firms and sectors or, as in Germany, through “eco-
nomic democracy” in the form of worker rights of “co-determination” in large companies. 
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ing them from achieving equilibrium – all in pursuit of objectives, such as full employ-
ment and social justice, that truly free markets would in the long run deliver anyway but 
must fail to deliver when distorted by politics. Economic crises, according to standard 
economic theories of “public choice” (Buchanan/Tullock 1962), essentially stem from 
political intervention, in particular from market-distorting intervention for “social” ob-
jectives. While the right kind of intervention is one that sets markets free from political 
interference, market-distorting intervention derives from an excess of democracy, or 
more precisely, from democracy being carried over, by irresponsible politicians, into the 
economy where it has no business. 
Today, not many go as far as the formidable Friedrich von Hayek, who in his later years 
advocated abolishing democracy as we know it in defense of economic freedom and 
civil liberty. Still, the cantus firmus of current neo-institutionalist economic theory 
sounds very Hayekian indeed. For capitalism to work, it requires a rule-bound eco-
nomic policy; constitutionally enshrined protection of markets and property rights 
from discretionary political interference; independent regulatory authorities; central 
banks firmly protected from electoral pressures; and international institutions such as 
the European Commission or the European Court of Justice that do not have to worry 
about popular reelection. Ideal, of course, would be some sort of assurance that govern-
ment will always be in the hands of the likes of a Thatcher or Reagan, leaders with the 
courage and the muscle to shield the economy from the immodest demands of short-
sighted citizens for protection and redistribution. It is not by chance, however, that such 
theories studiously avoid the crucial question of how to get from here to there, very 
likely because they have no answer, or at least none that can be made public. 
There are various ways to conceive of what is at the bottom of the friction between capi-
talism and democracy. For present purposes, I will characterize democratic capitalism as 
a political economy ruled by two conflicting principles, or regimes, of resource allocation: 
one operating according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as merit by a “free 
play of market forces,” and the other following social need, or entitlement, as certified by 
the collective choices of democratic politics. Governments under democratic capitalism 
are under pressure to honor both principles simultaneously although substantively the 
two almost never agree – or they can afford to neglect one in favor of the other only for 
a short time until they are punished by the consequences, political in the one case and 
economic in the other. Governments that fail to attend to democratic claims for protec-
tion and redistribution risk losing their majority while governments that disregard the 
claims for compensation from the owners of productive resources, as expressed in the 
language of marginal productivity, cause economic dysfunctions and distortions that 
will be increasingly unsustainable and will thereby also undermine political support. 
In the liberal utopia of standard economic theory, the tension in democratic capitalism 
between its two principles of allocation is overcome by the theory turning into what Marx 
had expected his theory to become: a material force (materielle Gewalt). Economics as a 
“science” instructs citizens and politicians that markets are better for them than politics, 
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and that real justice is market justice under which everybody is rewarded according to 
contribution rather than to needs redefined as rights. To the extent that economic theory 
became in this sense accepted as a social theory, it also would come true in the sense of be-
coming performative – which reveals its essentially rhetorical nature as an instrument of 
social construction by persuasion. In the real world, however, it is not all that easy to talk 
people out of their “irrational” beliefs in social and political rights, as distinguished from 
the law of the market and the right of property. Up to now at least, non-market notions 
of social justice have resisted all efforts at economic rationalization, forceful as they may 
have become especially in the bleierne Zeit of advancing neoliberalism. Apparently peo-
ple stubbornly refuse to give up on the idea of a moral economy (Thompson 1971; Scott 
1976) under which they have rights as people or as citizens that take precedence over the 
outcomes of market exchanges.2 In fact where they have a chance, as they inevitably do 
as long as there is democracy, they tend in one way or other to insist on the primacy of 
the social over the economic; on social commitments and obligations being protected 
from market pressures for “flexibility;” and on society honoring human expectations of 
a life outside of the dictatorship of ever fluctuating “market signals.” 3
In the economic mainstream, that there should be a conflict in a market economy be-
tween rivaling principles of allocation can be explained only by a deplorable lack of eco-
nomic education of citizens, or by demagoguery on the part of irresponsible politicians. 
Economic disorders, like inflation, public deficits, and excessive private or public debt 
result from insufficient knowledge of the economic laws that govern the functioning of 
the economy as a wealth creation machine, or from a frivolous disregard of such laws in 
selfish pursuit of political power. This is quite different in theories of political economy, 
to the extent that they take the political seriously.4 Such theories recognize market al-
location as one political-economic regime among others, one that is governed by the 
special interests of those owning scarce productive resources that put them in a strong 
market position, while its alternative, political allocation, is preferred by those with lit-
tle economic but potentially high political power. From this perspective, standard eco-
nomics is basically the theoretical exaltation of a political-economic social order that 
serves the interests of those well-endowed with market power, in that it equates their 
interests with the general interest and represents the distributional claims of the own-
ers of productive capital as technical imperatives of good, in the sense of scientifically 
sound, economic management. In fact, for political economy, if standard economists 
account for economic dysfunctions by a cleavage between traditionalist principles of 
2 The exact content of such rights may change and obviously differs between social and geo-
graphical locations. But certain elements seem universal, for example that someone who puts 
in a “good day’s work” should not be poor, meaning that his income should enable him and 
his family to participate fully in the life of his community. Other common principles of moral 
economy include the insistence on attributions of social worth different from economic worth, 
and on values and entitlements that cannot be expressed in terms of market prices.
3 This, to me, is the essence of what Polanyi ([1944]1957) means when he writes of a “counter-
movement” against the commodification of labor (Streeck 2009: 246 ff.).
4  That is, that they are not just functionalist efficiency theories. 
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moral economy and rational-modern principles of economic economy, this amounts to a 
tendentious misrepresentation of the nature of the problem as it hides the fact that the 
economic economy is also a moral economy, namely that of those commanding strong 
power in markets for indispensible productive resources.
In the language of mainstream economics, economic disturbances, as caused by market 
allocation being interfered with by politics, appear as punishment for governments fail-
ing to respect the natural laws that are the true governors of “the economy.” By contrast, 
a theory of political economy worth its name accounts for crises as manifestations of 
what one could call the Kaleckian reactions 5 of the owners of productive resources to 
democratic politics, penetrating into what they consider their exclusive domain, trying 
to prevent them from exploiting their market power to the fullest, and thereby violating 
their expectations of being justly rewarded for their astute risk-taking.6 Unlike political 
economy, standard economic theory treats social structure and the distribution of in-
terests and power vested in it as exogenous, holding them constant and thereby making 
them both invisible and, for the purposes of economic “science,” naturally given. The 
only politics such a theory can envisage are the inevitably counterproductive efforts by 
opportunistic or, at best, incompetent politicians to bend economic laws. Good eco-
nomic policy is nonpolitical by definition. This view is, of course, not shared by the 
many for whom politics is a much needed recourse against markets whose unfettered 
operation interferes with what they happen to feel is right. Unless they are somehow 
persuaded to adopt neoclassical economics as a self-evident model of what social life 
is and should be – unless, in other words, they are turned into practicing life-world 
economizers – their political demands as democratically expressed will differ from the 
prescriptions of standard economic theory. The implication is that while an economy, if 
5 In a seminal essay in 1943, Michal Kalecki identified the “confidence” of investors as a crucial 
factor determining economic performance (Kalecki 1943). Investor confidence, according to 
Kalecki, depends on the extent to which current profit expectations of capital owners are reli-
ably sanctioned by the distribution of political power and the policies to which it gives rise. 
Economic dysfunctions – unemployment in Kalecki’s case – ensue when business sees its profit 
expectations threatened by political interference. “Wrong” policies in this sense result in a loss 
of business confidence, which in turn may result eventually in what would amount to an in-
vestment strike by capital owners. Kalecki’s perspective makes it possible to model a capitalist 
economy as an interactive game, as distinguished from a natural or machine-like mechanism. If 
the economy is in a Kaleckian way conceived as interactive, the point at which capitalists react 
adversely to non-market allocation by withdrawing investment need not be seen as once and 
for all fixed and mathematically predictable but may be negotiable. For example, it may be set 
by a historically evolved and historically changeable level of aspiration or by strategic calcula-
tion. This is why predictions based on universalistic, i.e. historically and culturally indifferent, 
economic models so often fail: they assume fixed parameters where in reality these are socially 
determined and historically flexible.
6 In other words, standard economic accounts of economic crises are essentially representations, 
in the form of sets of simultaneous equations, of the strategic reactions of the owners of in-
dispensible productive resources, making what are the particularistic claims of a social group 
appear like the laws of gravity driving the motions of the stars in a Newtonian universe.
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sufficiently conceptually disembedded, may be modeled as tending toward equilibrium, 
a political economy may not, unless it is one devoid of democracy and run by a Platonic 
dictatorship of economist-kings. 
As long as capitalist politics fails to lead democratic societies out of the desert of corrupt 
democratic opportunism into the promised land of self-regulating markets, govern-
ments must fear their societies being torn apart by conflicts over distributional claims 
the sum total of which considerably exceeds what is at any point in time available for 
distribution. Outside of the, as we now know, exceptional and short periods when 
strong economic growth makes it possible for all parties to improve their positions 
simultaneously, democratic governments find themselves under pressure to convert, by 
whatever means, zero-sum into positive-sum distributional games. In democratic capi-
talism after the end of postwar growth, this was done essentially by moving additional, 
not yet existing resources into the pool out of which current distributional claims were 
settled. As we will see, different methods were successively employed to pull forward re-
sources that were still to be produced for present distribution and consumption. None 
of these lasted long as all of them were bound ultimately to result in economic crisis by 
provoking the resistance – what we have called the Kaleckian reactions – of those inter-
ested in an allocation of rewards according to the laws of the market.
II
Postwar democratic capitalism underwent its first crisis in the decade following the late 
1960s when inflation rates began rapidly to rise throughout the Western world. Acceler-
ating inflation resulted when declining economic growth made it difficult to sustain the 
political-economic peace formula between capital and labor that had ended domestic 
strife after the devastations of the Second World War. Essentially that formula entailed 
the organized working classes accepting capitalist markets and property rights in ex-
change for political democracy enabling them to achieve social security and a steadily 
rising standard of living. When the 1960s came to a close, more than two decades of 
uninterrupted economic growth had resulted in deeply rooted popular perceptions of 
continuous economic progress as a right of democratic citizenship – perceptions that 
translated into political expectations that governments felt constrained but were in-
creasingly unable to honor when growth began to slow down.
The structure of the “postwar settlement” between labor and capital was fundamentally 
the same across those otherwise widely different countries where democratic capitalism 
had come to be instituted. In addition to an expanding welfare state, it included a right 
of workers to free collective bargaining through independent trade unions, together 
with a political guarantee of full employment underwritten by governments liberally 
applying the toolkit of Keynesian economic policy. When growth began to falter, how-
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ever, the latter two in particular became difficult to maintain alongside each other. 
While free collective bargaining enabled workers through their unions to act effectively 
on what had meanwhile become firmly ingrained expectations of regular yearly wage 
increases, governments’ commitment to full employment, together with a growing wel-
fare state, protected unions from potential employment losses caused by wage settle-
ments in excess of productivity growth. Government economic policy thus increased 
the bargaining power of trade unions far beyond what a free labor market would have 
sustained. In the late 1960s this found expression in a worldwide wave of labor mili-
tancy fueled by a strong sense of political entitlement to a continuously rising standard 
of living unchecked by fears of unemployment.
In subsequent years governments all over the Western world faced the question of how 
to make trade unions moderate their members’ wage demands without having to rescind 
the Keynesian promise of secure full employment. In countries where the institutional 
structure of the collective bargaining system was not conducive to the negotiation of tri-
partite “social pacts,” governments remained convinced throughout the 1970s that allow-
ing unemployment to rise in order to contain real wage increases was too risky for their 
own survival, if not for the stability of capitalist democracy as such. Their only way out 
was an accommodating monetary policy that, while allowing free collective bargaining 
and politically-provided full employment to continue to coexist, did so at the expense of 
raising the going rate of inflation, with the risk of inflation accelerating over time.
Initially, and for a limited period, inflation is not much of a problem for workers repre-
sented by strong trade unions and politically powerful enough to achieve de jure or de 
facto wage indexation. Inflation comes at the expense primarily of holders of financial 
assets and of creditors, groups that do not as a rule include workers, or at least did not 
do so in the 1960s and 1970s. This is why inflation can be, and has been, described as a 
monetary reflection of distributional conflict between a working class demanding both 
employment security and a higher share in their country’s income, and a capitalist class 
striving to maximize the return on its capital. As the two sides act on mutually incom-
patible ideas of what is theirs by right, one emphasizing the entitlements of citizenship 
and the other those of property and productive achievement, inflation may also be 
considered an expression of anomy in a society which for structural reasons cannot 
agree on common criteria of social justice. It was in this sense that the eminent British 
sociologist John Goldthorpe, in the late 1970s, suggested that high and indeed accel-
erating inflation was ineradicable in a democratic-capitalist market economy that al-
lowed workers and citizens to organize politically to correct market outcomes through 
collective action (Goldthorpe 1978; Hirsch/Goldthorpe 1978).
For governments facing conflicting demands from workers and capital owners in 
a world of declining growth rates, an accommodating monetary policy was a conve-
nient ersatz method for avoiding zero-sum social conflict. In the immediate postwar 
years it had been economic growth that had provided governments, struggling with 
incompatible concepts of economic justice, with additional goods and services by which 
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to defuse class antagonisms. Now governments had to make do with additional money 
as yet uncovered by the real economy, as a means of pulling forward future resources 
into present consumption and distribution. This mode of conflict pacification, effec-
tive as it at first was, could not however continue indefinitely. As Friedrich von Hayek 
([1950]1967) never tired pointing out, sustained and in all likeliness over time acceler-
ating inflation is bound to give rise to all sorts of ultimately unmanageable economic 
distortions: among other things in relative prices, in the relation between contingent 
and fixed incomes, and especially in what economists refer to as economic incentives. In 
the end, by calling forth Kaleckian reactions from increasingly suspicious capital own-
ers, inflation will even produce unemployment, punishing the very workers whose in-
terests it may initially have served. At this point at the latest, governments under demo-
cratic capitalism will come under pressure to cease accommodating redistributive wage 
settlements and to restore monetary stability. 
Figure 1 Inflation rates, seven countries, 1970−2010 
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III
Inflation was conquered in the early 1980s (Figure 1) when the Federal Reserve Bank 
of the United States under its new chairman, Paul Volker, who had been appointed in 
1979, still during the Carter presidency, raised interest rates to an unprecedented height 
causing unemployment to jump to levels never seen since the Great Depression.7 The 
Volcker revolution, or one might also speak of the Volcker putsch, was sealed when 
President Reagan, who is said to have initially been afraid of the political fallout of 
Volcker’s aggressive disinflation policies, was re-elected in 1984. Before him, Margaret 
Thatcher, who had followed the American lead, had won a second term in June, 1983, 
also in spite of high unemployment and rapid de-industrialization caused, among other 
things, by a restrictive monetary policy. In both the US and the UK, disinflation was 
accompanied by fierce and in the end highly successful attacks by governments and 
employers on trade unions, epitomized by Reagan’s victory over the Air Traffic Con-
trollers and Thatcher’s breaking of the National Union of Mineworkers. In subsequent 
years, inflation rates throughout the capitalist world remained continuously low while 
7 On the following see Samuelson (2010) among others.
Figure 2 Unemployment rates, seven countries, 1970−2010
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unemployment went more or less steadily up (Figure 2). In parallel, unionization de-
clined almost everywhere, and strikes became so infrequent that some countries ceased 
to keep strike statistics (Figure 3).
The neoliberal era began with Anglo-American governments casting aside the political 
orthodoxy of postwar democratic capitalism. It was founded on the belief that infla-
tion was always preferable to unemployment as unemployment would be certain to 
undermine political support, not just for the government of the day but also for the 
democratic-capitalist political-economic regime. The experiments conducted by Rea-
gan and Thatcher on their electorates were observed closely by policy-makers world-
wide. Those, however, who may have hoped that the end of inflation would mean an 
end to economic disorder were soon to be disappointed. As inflation receded, public 
debt began to increase, and not entirely unexpectedly so. Already in the 1950s Anthony 
Downs (see for example Downs 1960) had noted that in a democracy the demands 
from citizens for public services tended to exceed the supply of resources available to 
government, and as early as the late 1960s the Marxist scholar James O’Connor sym-
pathetically commented upon by none other than Daniel Bell (1976), had seen emerg-
ing on the horizon of contemporary capitalism an endemic “fiscal crisis of the state” 
(O’Connor 1970a, 1970b, 1972, 1973).
Figure 3 Strike volume, seven countries, 1971−2007a
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Rising public debt in the 1980s had many causes. Stagnant growth had made taxpayers 
more averse than ever to taxation, and with the end of inflation, automatic tax increases 
through what was called “bracket creep” also came to an end. The same held for the 
continuous devaluation of public debt in the course of the devaluation of national cur-
rencies, a process that had first complemented economic growth, and then increasingly 
substituted for it, in reducing a country’s accumulated debt relative to its nominal in-
come. On the expenditure side, rising unemployment, caused by monetary stabilization, 
required rising expenditures on social assistance. Also the various social entitlements 
created in the 1970s in return for trade union wage moderation – as it were, deferred 
wages from the neo-corporatist era – began to mature and became due, increasingly 
burdening public households. 
With inflation no longer available for closing the gap between the demands of citizens 
on the one hand and of “the markets” on the other, the burden of securing social peace 
fell on the state and on public finance. Public debt turned out, for a while, to be a con-
venient functional equivalent of inflation. Like inflation, public debt made it possible to 
introduce resources into the distributional conflicts of the time that had not yet been in 
fact produced, enabling governments to draw on future resources in addition to those 
already on hand. What had changed was the method by which resources were pulled 
forward in time to satisfy politically irresistible or economically irrefutable demands 
that could not be simultaneously satisfied with existing economic resources alone. As 
the struggle between market and social distribution moved from the labor market to the 
political arena, electoral pressure took the place of trade union pressure. Governments, 
instead of inflating the currency, began to borrow on an increasing scale to accommo-
date demands for benefits and services as a citizen’s right, as well as competing claims 
for incomes to reflect as closely as possible the judgment of the market and thereby pro-
vide opportunities for a maximally profitable use of productive resources. Low inflation 
was helpful in this since it assured creditors that government bonds would keep their 
value, even over the long haul; and so were the low interest rates that had resulted when 
inflation had been stamped out.
Just like inflation, however, accumulation of public debt cannot go on forever. Econo-
mists have always warned of public deficit spending “crowding out” private investment, 
causing high interest rates and low growth. But they were never able to specify where 
exactly the critical threshold was. In actual practice, it turned out to be possible, at least 
for a while, to keep interest rates low by deregulating financial markets (Krippner 2011) 
while containing inflation through continued union-busting. Still, the US in particular, 
with its exceptionally low national savings rate, soon had to sell its government bonds 
not just to citizens but also to foreign investors, including sovereign wealth funds of 
various sorts (Spiro 1999). Moreover, as debt burdens rose, a growing share of public 
spending had to be devoted to debt service, even with interest rates remaining low – 
which could, however, not forever be taken for granted. Above all, there had to be a 
point, although apparently unknowable beforehand, at which creditors, foreign and 
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domestic alike, would begin to worry about getting their money back eventually. By 
then at the latest, pressures would begin to mount from “financial markets” for consoli-
dation of public budgets and a return to fiscal discipline.
IV
The dominant theme of the 1992 Presidential election in the United States was the two 
deficits, the one of the Federal Government and the other of the country as a whole in 
foreign trade. The victory of Bill Clinton, who had campaigned above all on the “double 
deficit,” set off worldwide attempts at fiscal consolidation, aggressively promoted under 
American leadership by international organizations such as the OECD and the IMF. Ini-
tially the Clinton administration seems to have envisaged closing the public deficit by 
accelerated economic growth brought about by social reform, such as increased public 
investment in education (Reich 1997). However, when in the midterm elections of 1994 
the Democrats lost their majority in both houses of Congress, Clinton soon turned to 
a policy of austerity involving deep cuts in public spending, including changes in social 
policy which, in the words of the President, were to put an end to “welfare as we know 
it.” 8 Indeed in the three final years of the Clinton Presidency, from 1998 to 2000, the US 
Federal Government for the first time in decades was running a budget surplus.
This is not to say, however, that the Clinton administration had somehow found a way 
of pacifying a democratic-capitalist political economy without recourse to additional, 
yet-to-be-produced economic resources. The Clinton strategy of social conflict man-
agement drew heavily on the deregulation of the financial sector that had already start-
ed under Reagan and was now driven further than ever before (Stiglitz 2003). Rapidly 
rising income inequality caused by continuing de-unionization and sharp cuts in social 
spending, as well as the reduction in aggregate demand caused by fiscal consolidation, 
were counterbalanced by unprecedented new opportunities for citizens and firms to 
indebt themselves. It was Colin Crouch who coined the fortuitous term, “privatized 
Keynesianism,” for what was in effect the replacement of public with private debt (2009). 
What this amounted to was that rather than the government borrowing money to fund 
equal access to decent housing or the formation of marketable work skills, it was now 
individual citizens who, under a debt regime of extreme generosity, were allowed, and 
in fact compelled, to take out loans at their own risk with which to pay for their educa-
tion or their advancement to a less destitute urban neighborhood.
The Clinton policy of fiscal consolidation and economic revitalization through finan-
cial deregulation had many beneficiaries. The rich were spared higher taxes while those 
among them – a fast-growing number – who had been wise enough to move their in-
8 With the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act” of 1996.
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terests into the financial sector, were making huge profits on the ever more complicated 
so-called “financial services” that they now had an almost unlimited license to sell. But 
the poor also prospered, at least some of them and for a while. Subprime mortgages be-
came a substitute, however illusory in the end, for the social policy that was simultane-
ously being scrapped, as well as for the wage increases that were no longer forthcoming 
at the lower end of a more and more flexible labor market. For African-Americans in 
particular, owning their home was not just the “American dream” come true but also 
a much-needed substitute for the old-age pensions that they were unable to earn in 
the labor markets of the day and that they had no reason to expect from a government 
pledged to a policy of permanent austerity. 
In fact for a time home ownership offered the middle class and even some of the poor 
an attractive opportunity to participate in the speculative craze that was making the 
rich so much richer in the 1990s and early 2000s, treacherous as that opportunity would 
later turn out to have been. As house prices escalated under rising demand from people 
who would in normal circumstances have never been able to buy a house, it became 
common practice to use the new financial instruments to extract part or all of one’s 
home equity to finance the – rapidly rising – costs of the next generation’s college edu-
cation, or simply for personal consumption to offset stagnant or declining wages. Nor 
was it entirely uncommon for home owners to use their new credit to buy a second or 
third house, in the hope to cash in on what was somehow expected to be an open-ended 
increase in the market value of real estate. In this way, unlike the era of public debt when 
future resources were procured for present use by government borrowing, now such 
resources were made available by a myriad of individuals selling in liberalized financial 
markets more or less solemn commitments to pay a significant share of their expected 
future earnings to creditors who in return provided them with the instant power to 
purchase whatever they needed or liked. Financial liberalization thus compensated for 
social policy being cut in an era of fiscal consolidation and public austerity. Individual 
debt replaced public debt, and individual demand, constructed for high fees by a rap-
idly growing money-making industry, took the place of collective demand governed 
by the state in supporting employment and profits in industries far beyond “financial 
services,” such as construction (Figure 4).
Especially after 2001 when the Federal Reserve switched to very low interest rates to 
prevent an economic slump, and with the return of high employment this implied, the 
new financial freedoms that had made the privatization of Keynesianism possible, sus-
tained, in addition to unprecedented profits in the financial sector, a booming economy 
that became the envy not least of the European Left. In fact Alan Greenspan’s policy of 
easy money supporting the rapidly growing indebtedness of American society was held 
up as a model by European trade unions, which never tired of noting that unlike the 
European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve was bound by law not just to provide mon-
etary stability but also high levels of employment. All of this, of course, ended when 
in 2008 the international credit pyramid on which the prosperity of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s had rested suddenly collapsed.
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V
With the crash of privatized Keynesianism, the crisis of postwar democratic capitalism 
entered its fourth and, up to now, latest stage, after the successive eras of inflation, public 
deficits, and private indebtedness (Figure 5)9. As the global financial system was about 
to disintegrate, nation-states had to restore economic confidence by socializing the bad 
loans licensed in compensation for fiscal consolidation. Together with the fiscal expan-
sion necessary to prevent a breakdown of what the Germans call the Realökonomie, this 
resulted in a dramatic new increase in public deficits and public debt – a development 
that, it may be noted, was not at all due to frivolous overspending by opportunistic 
politicians as implied by public choice theories, or to misconceived public institutions 
9 The diagram shows the development in the lead capitalist country, the United States, where the 
four stages unfold in ideal-typical fashion. For other countries it is necessary to make allow-
ances reflecting their particular circumstances, including their position in the global political 
economy. In Germany, for example, public debt already began to rise sharply in the 1970s. This 
corresponds to the fact that German inflation was low long before Volcker, due to the indepen-
dence of the Bundesbank and the monetarist policies it adopted as early as 1974 (Scharpf 1991).
Figure 4 Fiscal consolidation and private debt in percent of GDP, 
three countries, 1995−2008
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No. 87, OECD National Accounts Database.
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as suggested by a broad institutional economics literature produced in the 1990s under 
the auspices of, among others, the World Bank and the IMF (for a representative collec-
tion see Poterba/von Hagen 1999). 
The quantum leap in public indebtedness after 2008, which completely undid whatever 
fiscal consolidation might have been achieved in the preceding decade, reflected the 
fact that no democratic state could have dared to impose on its society another eco-
nomic crisis of the dimension of the Great Depression of the 1930s, as punishment for 
the excesses of a deregulated global money industry. Once again, political power was 
deployed to make future resources available for securing present social peace, in that 
states more or less voluntarily took upon themselves a significant share of the new debt 
originally created in the private sector, so as to reassure creditors. But while this effec-
tively rescued the financial industry’s money factories, reinstating in very short time 
their extraordinary profits, salaries and bonuses, it did not and could not prevent rising 
suspicions, on the part of the very same “financial markets” that had just been saved by 
national governments from the consequences of their own indiscretion, that in the pro-
cess governments might have overextended themselves. Even with the global economic 
crisis far from over, creditors began vociferously to demand a return to sound money 
through fiscal austerity, in search for reassurance that their vastly increased investment 
in government debt will not be lost.
Figure 5 The United States: Four crises of democratic capitalism, 1970−2010
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In the years after 2008, distributional conflict under democratic capitalism has turned 
into a complicated tug-of-war between global financial investors and sovereign national 
states. Where in the past workers struggled with employers, citizens with finance min-
isters, and private debtors with private banks, it is now financial institutions wrestling 
with the same states that they had only recently successfully blackmailed into saving 
them from themselves. While this is what we see on the surface, the underlying configu-
ration of power and interests is, however, far more complex and still awaits systematic 
exploration. For example, financial markets have since the crisis returned to charging 
different states widely different interest rates, thereby differentiating the pressure they 
apply on governments to make their citizens acquiesce with unprecedented spending 
cuts in line, again, with a basically unmodified market logic of distribution. In fact, 
given the amount of debt carried by most states today, even minor increases in the rate 
of interest on government bonds could cause fiscal disaster.10 At the same time, markets 
must avoid states declaring sovereign bankruptcy, which states always can do if market 
pressures become too strong. This is why other states have to be found that are willing 
to bail out those most at risk, in order to protect themselves from a general increase in 
interest rates on government bonds once the first state has defaulted. Solidarity, if one 
can call it this, between states in the interest of investors is also fostered where sovereign 
default would hit banks located outside the defaulting country, which might force the 
banks’ home countries once again to nationalize huge amounts of bad debt in order to 
stabilize their economies. 
There are still more facets to the way in which the tension in democratic capitalism 
between demands for social rights and the workings of free markets currently expresses 
itself today. Some governments, foremost among them the Obama administration, are 
making desperate attempts to generate renewed economic growth through even more 
debt – in the hope of future consolidation policies, should they become inevitable, be-
ing assisted by a sizeable growth dividend. Others may be secretly hoping for a return 
to inflation melting down accumulated debt by softly expropriating creditors – which 
would, like economic growth, mitigate the political tensions to be expected from auster-
ity. At the same time, financial markets as well as academic economists may be looking 
forward to a, given the nature of the new battlefield, more than ever promising fight 
against political interference with the forces of the market, once and for all reinstating 
market discipline and putting an end to all political attempts to subvert it.
Further complications arise from the fact that financial “markets,” whoever they may 
be, need government debt for safe investment, and pressing too hard for balanced 
budgets may deprive them of highly desirable investment opportunities. The middle 
classes of the rich countries in particular have put a good part of their savings into 
government bonds, not to mention workers now heavily invested in supplementary 
10 For a state with public debt equaling 100 percent of GDP, an increase by two percentage points 
in the average rate of interest it has to pay to its creditors would raise its yearly deficit by the 
same amount. A current budget deficit of four percent of GDP would as a result increase by half. 
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pensions. Balanced budgets would likely mean that states would have to take from their 
middle classes, in the form of higher taxes, what these now can save and invest, among 
other things in public debt. Not only would citizens no longer collect interest, but they 
would also cease to be able to pass their savings on to their children. However, while 
this should make them interested in states being, if not debt-free, then reliably able to 
fulfill their obligations to their creditors, it may mean that they would have to pay for 
their government’s liquidity in the form of deep cuts in public benefits and services on 
which they also, in part, depend.
At the end of the day, however complicated the cross-cutting cleavages between the 
various interests in the emerging new field of the international politics of public debt 
may be, the price for financial stabilization is likely to be paid by those other than the 
owners of money, or at least of real money. For example, public pension reform will be 
accelerated by fiscal pressures at home and abroad, and to the extent that governments 
default anywhere in the world, private pensions will be hit as well. The average citizen 
will pay – for the consolidation of public finances, the bankruptcy of foreign states, the 
rising rates of interest on the public debt and, if eventually necessary and still possible, 
for another rescue of national and international banks – with his or her private savings, 
with cuts in public entitlements, with reduced public services and, one way or other, 
with higher taxes.
VI
In the four decades since the end of postwar growth, the epicenter of the tectonic ten-
sion inside the political economy of democratic capitalism has migrated from one insti-
tutional location to the next, in the course giving rise to a sequence of different but sys-
tematically related economic disturbances. In the 1970s the conflict between democratic 
claims for social justice and capitalist demands for distribution by marginal productivi-
ty played itself out primarily in national labor markets where trade union wage pressure 
under politically guaranteed full employment caused accelerating inflation. When what 
was in effect redistribution by debasement of the currency became economically unsus-
tainable, forcing governments under high political risks to put an end to it, the conflict 
reemerged in the electoral arena. Here it gave rise to growing disparity between public 
spending and public revenues and, as a consequence, to rapidly rising public debt, in 
response to voter demands for benefits and services in excess of what a democratic-cap-
italist economy could be made to hand over to its “tax state” (Schumpeter [1918]1991).
Just like inflation, conflict management by deficit spending could not continue for-
ever. When efforts to rein in public debt became unavoidable, however, they had to be 
accompanied, for the sake of social peace, by financial deregulation easing access to 
private credit as an alternative route to accommodating normatively popular and po-
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litically powerful demands of citizens for security and prosperity. This, too, lasted not 
much longer than a decade until the global economy almost faltered under the burden 
of unrealistic promises of future payment for present consumption and investment, 
licensed by governments in compensation for fiscal austerity. Since then, the clash be-
tween popular ideas of social justice and economic insistence on market justice has once 
again changed sites, re-emerging this time in international capital markets and the com-
plex contests currently taking place there between financial institutions and electorates, 
governments, states and international organizations. Now the issue is how far states can 
and must go in enforcing on their citizens the property rights and profit expectations 
of those that call themselves “the markets,” so as to avoid having to declare bankruptcy 
while protecting as best they can what may still remain of their democratic legitimacy.
Toleration of inflation, acceptance of public debt, and deregulation of private credit 
were no more than temporary stopgaps for governments confronted with an appar-
ently irrepressible conflict between the two contradictory principles of allocation un-
der democratic capitalism: social rights on the one hand and marginal productivity, as 
determined by the relationship between supply and demand, on the other. Each of the 
three worked for a while until they began to cause more problems than they solved, 
indicating that a lasting reconciliation of social and economic stability in capitalist de-
mocracies is no more than a utopian project. Eventually, all that governments were able 
to achieve in dealing with the crises of their day was to move them to new arenas where 
they reappeared in new forms. There is no reason to believe that the successive manifes-
tation of the contradictions inherent in democratic capitalism in ever new varieties of 
economic disorder should today be at an end. 
VII
The capacity of the social sciences to make predictions is limited if it exists at all. Like 
evolutionary biology, social science may, if it does its work well, provide plausible inter-
pretations of the past in the form of systematically comparable historical reconstruc-
tions of chains of events that at first glance may appear nothing but chaotic. Looking 
forward, however, the social scientist faces the same open future as anybody else. Never-
theless, it appears to me that one can say with some certainty that the political manage-
ability of democratic capitalism has in recent years sharply declined, obviously in some 
countries more than in others, but also and more importantly overall in the emerging 
global political-economic system. As a result the risks seem to be growing, both for de-
mocracy and for the economy. 
Beginning with the economy, it would seem that economic policy-makers since the 
Great Depression have rarely, if ever, been faced with as much uncertainty as today. 
One example among many is that “the markets” expect not just fiscal consolidation but 
Streeck: The Crisis in Context 19
also, and at the same time, a reasonable prospect of future economic growth. How the 
two may be combined, however, is not at all clear. Although the risk premium on Irish 
government debt fell when the country pledged itself to aggressive deficit reduction, a 
few weeks later it rose again, allegedly because the country’s consolidation program 
suddenly appeared so strict that it would make economic recovery impossible.11 More-
over, among those who must know, one finds a widely shared conviction that the next 
bubble is already building somewhere in a world that is more than ever flooded with 
cheap money. Subprime mortgages may no longer offer themselves for investment, at 
least not for the time being. But there are the markets for raw materials, or the new 
internet economy. Nothing prevents financial firms from using the surplus of money 
provided by the central banks to enter whatever appear to be the new growth sectors, 
on behalf of their favorite clients and, of course, of themselves. After all, with regulatory 
reform in the financial sector having failed in almost all respects, capital requirements 
are still as low as they were, and the banks that were too big to fail in 2008 can count on 
being so also in 2012 or 2013. This leaves them with the same capacity for blackmailing 
the public that they were able to deploy so skillfully three years ago. But now the public 
bailout of private capitalism on the model of 2008 may be impossible to repeat, if only 
because public finances are already stretched beyond their limit.
As I said, it is not for the social scientist to make predictions, for example on where 
the next bubble may burst; on whether the United States will continue to find credi-
tors willing to finance their apparently ineradicable double deficit; whether it will be 
possible or not to impose the costs of consolidation entirely on pensioners and public 
sector workers, so as to spare “the markets” from economic hardship; or to what ex-
tent economic growth or inflation will be forthcoming to ease countries’ debt burdens. 
What we do know, however, is that democracy is as much at risk in the current crisis as 
the economy. Using concepts developed long ago by the British sociologist David Lock-
wood (1964), not only has the system integration of contemporary societies – that is, the 
efficient functioning of their capitalist economies – become precarious, but also their 
social integration. With the arrival of a new age of austerity, the capacity of national 
states to mediate between what in the past were the rights of citizens on the one hand 
and the evolving requirements of capital accumulation on the other has profoundly 
suffered. For example, governments everywhere face stronger resistance to tax increases 
than ever, in particular in highly indebted countries where fresh public money would 
have to be spent for many years to pay for goods that have long been consumed. Even 
more importantly, with continuously increasing global interdependence the times are 
over when it was still possible to pretend that the tensions between economy and society, 
and indeed between capitalism and democracy, could be handled inside national politi-
cal communities. No government can today govern without paying very close attention 
to international constraints and obligations, in particular to obligations in financial 
11 In other words, not even “the markets” are willing to put their money on the supply-side mantra 
according to which growth is stimulated by cuts in public spending. On the other hand, who can 
say how much new debt is enough, and how much too much, for a country to outgrow its old debt.
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markets forcing it to impose sacrifices on its population. The crises and contradictions 
of democratic capitalism have finally become internationalized, playing themselves out 
not just within states but also between them, and simultaneously at both levels in as yet 
unexplored combinations and permutations.
As we now read in the papers almost every day, “the markets” have begun in unprece-
dented ways to dictate what presumably sovereign and democratic states may still do for 
their citizens and what they must refuse them. Moreover, the very same ratings agencies 
that were instrumental in bringing about the disaster of the global money industry are 
now threatening to downgrade the bonds of the very same states that had to accept a 
previously unimaginable level of new debt to rescue that industry and the capitalist 
economy as a whole. Politics still contains and distorts markets, but only, it seems, at a 
level far remote from the daily experience and the political and organizational capaci-
ties of normal people: the US, armed to its teeth not just with aircraft carriers but also 
with an unlimited supply of credit cards for the most militant shoppers in human his-
tory, still gets China to buy its mounting debt and manages to muscle the three global 
ratings firms, all based at the southern tip of Manhattan, into awarding its government 
bonds the triple A to which it feels forever entitled. All others, however, have to listen 
to what “the markets” tell them. As a result citizens increasingly perceive their national 
governments, not as their agents, but as those of other states or of international organi-
zations, such as the IMF or the European Union, that are immeasurably more insulated 
from electoral pressure than was the traditional nation-state. In countries like Greece 
and Ireland in particular, anything resembling democracy will be effectively suspended 
for many years as national governments of whatever political color, forced to behave 
responsibly as defined by international markets and organizations, will have to impose 
strict austerity on their societies, at the price of becoming increasingly unresponsive to 
their citizens (Mair 2009).
Democracy is being preempted not just in those countries, however, that are currently 
under attack by “the markets.” Germany, which is still doing relatively well economically, 
is doing so not least because it has committed itself to decades of public expenditure 
cuts. In addition, the German government had, and will again have, to get its citizens to 
provide liquidity to countries at risk of defaulting, not just to save German banks, but 
also to stabilize the common European currency and prevent a general increase in the 
rate of interest on public debt, as is likely occur in the case of the first country collapsing. 
The high political cost of this is documented by the progressive decay of the electoral 
capital of the Merkel government, culminating up to now12 in two crushing defeats in 
major regional elections. Populist rhetoric to the effect that perhaps creditors should 
also pay a share of the costs, as vented by the Chancellor in early 2010, was quickly 
abandoned when “the markets” expressed shock by slightly raising the rate of interest 
on new public debt. Now the talk is about the need to shift, in the words of the German 
12 April 2011.
Streeck: The Crisis in Context 21
Finance Minister, from old-fashioned “government,” which is no longer up to the new 
challenges of globalization, to “governance,” meaning in particular a lasting curtailment 
of the budgetary authority of the Bundestag.13
In several ways, the political expectations democratic states are today facing from their 
new principals are such that they may be impossible to meet. International markets 
and organizations require that not just governments but also citizens credibly commit 
themselves to fiscal consolidation. Political parties that oppose austerity must be re-
soundingly defeated in national elections, and both government and opposition must 
be equally pledged to “sound finance,” or else the cost of debt service will inexorably rise. 
Elections in which voters have no effective choice, however, may be perceived by them 
as inauthentic, which may cause all sorts of political disorder, from declining turnout 
to a rise of populist parties to riots in the streets. What may at first sight help is that the 
arenas of distributional conflict have with time become ever more remote from popu-
lar politics. Compared to the fiscal diplomacy and the international capital markets of 
today, the national labor markets of the 1970s, with the manifold opportunities they 
offered for corporatist political mobilization and inter-class coalitions, and the politics 
of public spending of the 1980s were not necessarily beyond either the grasp or the 
strategic reach of the “man in the street.” Since then, the battlefields on which the con-
tradictions of democratic capitalism are fought out have become ever more complex, 
making it exceedingly difficult for anyone outside of the political and financial elites 
to recognize the underlying interests and identify their own.14 While this may generate 
apathy at the mass level and thereby make life easier at the elite level, there is, however, 
no relying on it in a world in which blind compliance with the demands of financial 
investors is made to appear the only institutionally rational and responsible behavior. 
13 Wolfgang Schäuble, in an interview with the Financial Times, December 5, 2010: “We need new 
forms of international governance, global governance and European governance …” As sum-
marized by the FT: “If the German parliament were asked for a vote today on giving up national 
budgetary authority, ‘you would not get a Yes vote,’ he added. But ‘if you would give us some 
months to work on this, and if you give us the hope that other member states will agree as well, 
I would see a chance’.” Schäuble was, fittingly, “speaking as winner of the FT competition for 
European finance minister of the year.”
14 For example, political appeals for redistributive “solidarity” are now directed at entire nations 
asked by international organizations to support other entire nations, such as Slovenia being 
urged to help Ireland, Greece and Portugal. This hides the fact that those being supported by 
this sort of “international solidarity” are not the people in the streets but the banks, domestic 
and foreign, that would otherwise have to accept losses, or lower profits. It also neglects differ-
ences in national income. While Germans are on average richer than Greeks (although some 
Greeks are much richer than almost all Germans), Slovenians are on average much poorer than 
the Irish, who have statistically a higher per capita income than nearly all Euro countries, in-
cluding Germany. Essentially the new conflict alignment translates class conflicts into inter-
national conflicts, pitting nations against each other that are all subject to the same financial 
market pressures for public austerity. Rather than from those who have long resumed collecting 
their “bonuses,” ordinary people “on the streets” are told to demand “sacrifices” from other 
ordinary people, who happen to be citizens of other states, to somehow make less painful the 
“sacrifices” they themselves are asked to make.
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To those who refuse to be talked out of other, social rationalities and responsibilities, 
such a world may at some point seem nothing but absurd, making it the only rational 
and responsible conduct to throw as many wrenches as possible into the works of haute 
finance. Where democracy as we know it is effectively suspended, as it already is in 
countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal, street riots and popular insurrection could 
be the last remaining mode of political expression for those devoid of market power. 
Should we hope in the name of democracy that we will soon have the opportunity to 
observe a few examples?
Social science can do little if anything to help resolve the structural tensions and con-
tradictions underlying the economic and social disorders of the day. What it can do, 
however, is bring them to light and identify the historical continuities in which present 
crises can only be fully understood. It also can – and indeed I believe it must – point out 
the drama of democratic states being turned into debt collecting agencies on behalf of 
a global oligarchy of investors compared to which C. Wright Mills’ “power elite” (1956) 
must appear like a shining example of liberal pluralism. More than ever, economic 
power seems today to have become political power while citizens appear to be almost 
entirely stripped of their democratic defenses and their capacity to impress on the po-
litical economy interests and demands incommensurable with those of capital owners. 
In fact, looking back at the democratic-capitalist crisis sequence since the 1970s, one 
cannot but be afraid of the possibility of a new, however temporary, settlement of so-
cial conflict in advanced capitalism, this time entirely in favor of the propertied classes 
now firmly entrenched in their politically unconquerable institutional stronghold, the 
international financial industry.
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